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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a student away from home for the first time
attending college. Imagine further that you have a schola.rship from
your employer that helps pay your tuition. As part of the requirements
of that scholarship, you have to work part time at the local franchise
of your scholarship sponsor-a national fast food chain. During the
course of your employment, your supervisor sexually assaults you.'
You sue your employer for sexual harassment based on this and other
offensive insults at work. You come to trial thinking you will finally
be vindicated; however, what happens at trial proves to be a further
insult.
t Copyright, 1998, Theresa M. Beiner.
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. I
would like to thank John M. A. DiPippa, my colleague at the University of Arkansas
at Little Rock School of Law, and Carl Tobias for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this article. Additional thanks to Nicana Sherman and Kathryn Fitzhugh of
the UALR Law Library, for their assistance in my many research requests. This article
was made possible by a grant from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School
of Law. This artide is dedicated to my daughter, Erin Gauger, whose existence has
made me consider more fully the way the world and the legal system works.
1. The facts described above come from the California Court of Appeal's decision in
Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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At trial, the judge, who also acts as the fact finder, questions you
extensively, asking about your motivations for bringing the case and
suggesting that you might have brought the case because you wanted
to prove something to your father.2 He asks you during your testi-
mony if you understand the seriousness of your allegations and the
ramifications for your alleged harassers.3 He asks you if you under-
stand that it is your word against the word of your harasser. Further,
the judge is impatient with your case generally, irritably asking your
attorney how long the case is going to take.' Finally, the judge
"deride[s]" the testimony of your rape trauma counselor that you ex-
hibited characteristic behavior of rape trauma syndrome by
commenting that the witness "should check and see if they come in
with a big 'R' stamped on their forehead in red'letters, and then we'll
all know."5 When-your counselor concludes her testimony, your at-
torney asks whether the witness may remain. The judge comments
that "[i]f she's excused she can sit here. If she wants to listen to all of
this nonsense, she's welcome."6 It is not surprising, given the judge's
general attitude directed toward you and your claim, that he does not
find your testimony credible. 7 This describes Marie Catchpole's day in
court in her sexual harassment case against her former employer.
The plaintiff in this case was ironically lucky; the judge in her
case exhibited obvious bias against both her and her claim, and the
Court of Appeals found a basis for reversal on the appearance of his
gender bias.' Yet, one is left to wonder how many plaintiffs suffer at
2. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
3. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
4. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
5. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
6. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
7. Catchpok, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2.d at 446-54.
8. The Court of Appeals concluded that
[t]he [trial] court's remarks throughout trial show that its conception of
the circumstances that may constitute sexual harassment were based on
stereotyped thinking about the nature and roles of women and myths and
misconceptions about the economic and social realities of women's lives.
The average person on the street might therefore justifiably doubt whether
the trial in this case was impartial.
Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454. Relying heavily on the Ninth Circuit's Gender
Bias Task Force Report, a California appellate court reversed the decision by the trial
court for the defendants in a sexual harassment case based on the apparent gender
bias of the male trial judge. The court did not reach the issue of whether the judge
was actually biased against the plaintiff based on her sex, instead holding that
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the hands of judges who misapprehend the nature of society, their
claim, or the factual predicament underlying their claim, because of a
lack of understanding, empathy, or experience in a similar situation.
After reading the trial transcript in the case of Marie Catchpole, 9 I
found myself asking whether having a woman judge would have made
a difference.
This article is aimed at this general question, the response to
which has been elusive: Does the race, gender, or other background
characteristics of a judge make a difference in the outcome of cases?
The effects of diversity on the bench are just becoming measurable.'0
Many legal scholars have assumed diversity will make a difference."
While this conclusion may seem commonsensical,12 it is important to
be able to support such assertions with actual data. The supposition
[wihere the average person could well entertain doubt whether the trial
judge was impartial, appellate courts are not required to speculate whether
the bias was actual or merely apparent or whether the result would have
been the same if the evidence had been impartially considered and the
matter dispassionately decided... but should reverse the judgment and
remand the matter to a different judge for a new trial on all issues.
Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
9. I was one of the attorneys who represented Ms. Catchpole in her appeal.
10. Compare Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals,
77 JUDicATURE 129 (1993) with David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of
Women State Supreme Court Justices: Are They Tokens or Outsiders? 12 Jusr. Sys. J.
232, 236 (1987)[hereinafter Allen & Wall, Behavior] (noting difficulty in assessing
patterns of voting by women judges due to small sample sizes).
11. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The FederalJudiciary Engendered, 5 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 123
(1990); Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HoFsrRa L. REv. 171
(1990)(urging President Bush to appoint more women) [hereinafter Tobias, Gender
Gap].; Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. GN. L. REv.
1237 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap](urging appointment of
more women); Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judici-
ary?, 62 JUDIcATuRE 488 (1979)[hereinafter Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative
Action]; Elliot Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising It Higher?: Affirmative Action
andJudicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & PoL'y REv. 270
(1983).
12. As a professor who teaches classes covering controversial subjects, I have been (and
continue to be) a firsthand witness to the effects that the background of my students
can have on class discussions as well as my students' analyses of a given issue. For ex-
ample, in my Employment Discrimination class, I have witnessed the influence of my
students' experiences on their approach to legal issues. I recall a student who had
taken consistently conservative positions throughout the class arguing in favor of ex-
tending Tide VII to gays and lesbians. His reasons came from his very positive
experience with gays while working at a restaurant. This leads me to wonder how
such factors affect judges.
1999]
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has been that diversity on the bench will take into account differing
viewpoints that exist in a multi-cultural society like our own, thereby
making justice more fair or, at least, giving it the appearance of being
fair. Driven in part by principles of legal realism, this theory has
found support through the voices of both legal academics and social
scientists. This position, however, is not without its detractors and
skeptics.13 It also begs some fundamental questions: Will diversity on
the bench really have an effect on the outcome of cases and in the
manner in which justice is administered?
My particular concern is with civil rights cases and, specifically,
employment discrimination law. Plaintiffs' practitioners have become
increasingly frustrated with the hostility of the courts to such claims. 4
Civil rights cases, often involving issues of discriminatory mistreat-
ment based on race, sex, or other protected status, 5 is an area in which
diversity should have an impact. With 'the cards being ever increas-
ingly stacked against plaintiffs by the courts themselves-not
Congress 6 - it's important to examine who these judges are who are
lessening the enforcement of civil rights laws.
In this article, I begin by looking at the demographics of the fed-
eral judiciary. I then look at what political scientists and legal scholars
have found about the voting patterns of these judges. While my par-
ticular focus is on the federal judiciary, where studies have been
conducted that are helpful to my inquiry, I also refer to state judiciar-
13. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence oflJudicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LFA. SrUD. 257 (1995) (finding minimal evi-
dence of ideological influence on decision making in three federal trial courts); Frank
B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisci-
plinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251, 274-75 (1997)(noting that one criticism
of Critical Legal Studies scholars is that they do not empirically support their theo-
ries).
14. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the Civil Rights Act:
The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RuTGFRS L. Rav. 965, 985 & n.52
(1993)(noting that the success rate of Title VII plaintiffs has declined over time);
Overwhelming Majority ofADA Job Suits Fail in Court, Bar Association Survey Finds,
67 U.S. L. WY. 2005 (7/7/98)(discussing ABA survey showing that in 92% of ADA
cases that result in court rulings, the defendant prevails).
15. For example, Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a).
16. Indeed, Congress has sought to counteract much of what the courts, and the Su-
preme Court in particular, have done to this area of the law within the last fifteen
years. See Culp, supra note 14, at 983-1005 (describing Supreme Court precedent
leading up to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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ies. I emphasize civil rights laws because it is an area that political scientists
have studied extensively and that has been the focus of much of my own
research. In addition, most of the studies I discuss seek to assess differ-
ences in judicial voting based on the gender of the judge rather than the
race of the judge. This is because there have been more women judges
appointed than minority judges, making it easier for political scientists
and legal scholars to find statistically significant sample sizes. I conclude,
after reviewing the work of political scientists and legal scholars, that di-
versity could well lead to better enforcement by the courts of civil rights
laws. My bottom line is consonant with what others have said: diversity
on the bench is key to promoting the sort of mutual understanding that
produces the best results in civil rights cases.
I. WHO Is ON THE BENCH?
A fundamental starting point for any discussion of diversity on
the bench is to ask, "Who are the judges?" Political scientists have
considered whether the identity of the appointing president is predic-
tive of judicial outcomes.17 Therefore, I will begin my discussion by
looking at judicial appointments, president by president. I begin with
the Carter Administration, because it was the first presidential ad-
ministration to make a concerted and effective effort to diversify the
federal bench.
A. The Carter Administration
Until the Carter Administration, there were very few women
(a total of eight)" and minorities appointed to the federal
17. See infra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
18. See Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts:
Gender Effects in the Courts ofAppeals, 56 J. PoL 425 (1994). The Federal Judicial
Center provided statistics showing that 10 women had been appointed to the federal
judiciary prior to the Carter Administration. See Federal Judicial History Office, Fed-
eral Judicial Center, Memo entitled Women Judges as Percentage of TotalAppointments
(providing number of women appointed through the end of President's Clinton's
first term) [hereinafter Federal Judicial History Office, Women Judges as Percentage].
However, it appears that two of these women judges were appointed to the United
States Customs Court, and therefore may not have been counted because they were not
serving on a federal district court or court of appeals. See Federal Judicial History Office,
Memo entitled Women Judges Listed by Nominating President. At the time President
Carter took office, six active federal judges were women. See Slotnick, supra note 11, at
271. Of this number, only one sat on a court of appeal. See Robert J. Lipshutz &
1999]
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bench.19 The Carter Administration was the first to name a significant
number of female and minority judges. Indeed, the Carter Admini-
stration actively sought out qualified women and minorities to fill
federal judgeships.20 In addition, it "actively sought to name judges
who were liberal, particularly on civil rights issues, to the courts of
appeals." 2' With respect to gender diversity, President Carter ap-
pointed forty-one women to the bench, or 15.7 percent of judicial
appointments during his four years in office," including eleven
women to the United States Courts of Appeals and twenty-nine to the
federal district courts.as President Carter also appointed fifty-five Afri-
can American judges to the federal bench. 24 Carter appointed the
highest percentage of non-white judges to both the district courts and
courts of appeals compared to his immediate successors and President
Reagan. 25 By the end of his presidency, due in large part to an increase
Douglas B. Huron, Achieving a More Representative Federal Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE
483 (1979).
19. See Slotnick, supra note 11, at 271 (noting that only 22 blacks or Hispanics sat as
active federal judges at the time that President Carter took office). Only two African
American judges held positions on the eleven federal courts of appeal. See Lipshutz &
Huron, supra note 18, at 483.
20. See Slomick, supra note 11, at 271, 275-77. For additional information describing
the manner in which the Carter administration appointed federal judges, see Lipshutz
& Huron, supra note 18; Katherine Randall, The Success ofAffirmative Action in the
Sixth Circuit, 62 JuDICATURE 486 (1979).
21. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts
ofAppeals, 58 OHio ST. L.J. 1635, 1679 (1998).
22. See Federal Judicial History Office, Women Judges as Percentage, supra note 18
(noting percentage as 15.7%); Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 11, at
1238 (noting percentage as 15.9%). Other sources state that Carter appointed 40
female judges. See Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive La Difference?
73 JuDIcATuRE 204 (1990) [hereinafter Martin, Men and Women]. In addition, these
women came from a variety of non-traditional legal career paths. See Martin, Men
and Women, supra. For an interesting discussion of some of the obstacles that African
American appointees face due to their differing career paths, see Peter G. Fish, Evalu-
ating the Black Judicial Applicant, 62 JUDIcATURE 495 (1979).
23. See Songer et al., supra note 18, at 425.
24. See Martin, Men and Women, supra note 22, at 204.
25. See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing
Up, 72 JUDICATuRE 318, 322 (1989) [hereinafter Goldman, Reagan vJudicial Legacy].
In particular, 78.7% of Carter's district court appointees were white, whereas 92.4%
of Reagan's appointees were white, 88.5% of Ford's appointees were white, 95.5% of
Nixon's appointees were white, and 93.4% of Johnson's appointees were white.
Among groups represented in the Carter administration, 13.9% of Carter's district
court appointees were African American, 6.9% were Hispanic, and 0.5% were Asian.
See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra. In terms of Court of Appeals appoint-
ments, 78.6% of Carter's appointees were white, whereas 97.4% of Reagan's were
(Vol. 6:113
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in the number of federal judgeships, President Carter had appointed
40 percent of the sitting federal bench26 and fifty-six out of 121 active
judges on the United States Courts of Appeal.27
Carter's appointees differed from those of other presidents in
ways aside from their gender and racial backgrounds. For example, in
a study comparing Reagan's appointments to those of his immediate
predecessors (i.e., Carter, Ford, Nixon, and Johnson), Carter had the
highest percentage of appointees to the district courts with previous
28judicial experience. Carter appointed the largest percentage of dis-
trict judges from public-supported undergraduate and law schools. 29
In addition, Carter appointed the largest percentage of less wealthy
judges.3 Indeed, according to one study, 60.2 percent of Carter's non-
traditional appointees3' earned less than $60,000/year before their ju-
dicial appointment, whereas only 43.5 percent of Carter's traditional
appointees earned less than that amount.32 Twenty-five percent of
Carter's white males earned over $100,000/year, whereas only 8.8
percent of Carter's non-traditional appointees earned over
white, 100% of Ford's were white, 97.8% of Nixon's were white, and 95% of John-
son's were white. See Goldman, Reagans Judicial Legacy, supra at 324.
26. See Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal
Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL 596 (1985). Carter appointed 258
judges. See Sue Davis, President Carter's Selection Reforms andJudicial Policymaking: A
Voting Analysis of the United States Courts of Appeals, 14 AM. POL. Q. 328, 329
(1986).
27. See John Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: the Influence ofAffirmative Action
and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 67 JUDICATURE 164, 167
(1983).
28. See Goldman, Reagan 'sJudicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 322.
29. See Goldman, Reagan'sJudicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 322, table 2. 57.4% of Car-
ter's appointees to district courts came from public supported undergraduate
institutions, compared to only 35.5% of Reagan's, 48.1% of Ford's, 41.3% of
Nixon's and 38.5% of Johnson's district court appointees. See Goldman, Reagan's
Judicial Legacy, supra.
30. See Goldman, Bush 's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JuDicArua 282, 287
(1993) [hereinafter Goldman, Bush'sJudicial Legacy]. 35.8% of Carter's district judge
appointees had net worths less than $200,000. Only 10.1% of the Reagan Admini-
stration's district judge appointees had net worths less than $200,000. Of Bush
appointees, only 17.6% had net worths under $200,000. See Goldman, Bush'sJudi-
cial Legacy, supra.
31. I use "non-traditional" judges to mean those who were not white males, i.e., women
and minority group members. For further discussion of the appointment of these
judges, see Goldman, Should There BeAffirmativeAction, supra note 11.
32. See Slotnick, supra note 11, at 282.
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$100,000/year. 33 This is likely a result, in part, of the differing career
paths between Carter's traditional and non-traditional appointees. For
example, 48.6 percent of Carter's non-traditional nominees came
from a public defender/legal aid background, whereas only 23.7 per-
cent of his white male nominees came from that background." In
addition, a higher percentage of Carter's non-traditional nominees
came from other judicial positions and a much lower percentage from
private practice compared to his traditional nominees!' The majority
of Carter appointees had net worths of less than $500,000, whereas
the majority of Bush appointees had -net worths over $500,000."
B. The Reagan Administration
The Reagan Administration set out to appoint judges of a par-
ticular ideology to the bench . Reagan sought to appoint judges that
held views consistent with his judicial philosophy. "There was the ex-
pectation that they would be sympathetic to the social agenda
positions of the administration which were a reaction to what the ad-
ministration saw as judicial legislation of new rights."38 As one scholar
put it, Ronald Reagan attempted to "appoint judges who supported
school prayer, opposed abortion, and favored harsh criminal penal-
ties." 39 This is reflected in the absence of the appointment of
Democrats to the Court of Appeals during the Reagan Administra-
tion.4°
During the Reagan Administration, few women were appointed.
The Reagan Administration gave a dismal 8.3 percent of its judicial
33. See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, ati287.
34. See Slotnick, supra note 11, at 292-93.
35. See Slomick, supra note 11, at 293.
36. See Goldman, Bush Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 287.
37. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 319-320 (asserting that the
Reagan Administration "engaged in the most systematic judicial philosophical
screening of judicial candidates ever seen in the nation's history"); Tobias, Gender
Gap, supra note 11, at 173.
38. Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 327.
39. George, supra note 21, at 1680.
40. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy1 supra note 25, at 325. Reagan appointed no
Democrats to the Court of Appeals, whereas previous Republican administrations
were able to find acceptable Democratic judicial candidates. See Goldman, Reagan's
JudicialLegacy, supra note 25, at 325.
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appointments to women, or thirty-three out of 399 appointments.41
Reagan appointed three Supreme Court associate justices, one chief
justice, seventy-eight court of appeals judges, and 290 district court
judges. 2 Due to retirements and internal appointments, by the end of
Reagan's presidency, he had appointed 47 percent of the judges in
active service.43 Reagan also made a larger proportion of his appoint-
ments from large law firms than any previous administration.4
Although Carter appointed the fewest district court judges with Ivy
League undergraduate educations, Reagan appointed the lowest pro-
portion overall of Ivy League law school graduates.
45
Compared with those of his immediate predecessors, Reagan's
appointments are of a mixed sort. Although Reagan did not come
close to appointing the percentage of women that the Carter Admini-
stration appointed, he was second in the percentage of appointments
of females in comparison to the Carter, Ford, Nixon, and Johnson• • • 46
Administrations. While he was second, again, only to the Carter
Administration in the percentage of Hispanics he appointed, his
"record of appointment of African-Americans was the worst since the
Eisenhower administration,'47 and his record on Hispanics is some-
what deceiving. He appointed only one African American and one
Hispanic judge to the Courts of Appeal."
41. See Federal Judicial History Office, Women Judges as Percentage, supra note 18; To-
bias, Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 11, at 1238 (noting the 8.3%, but stating it
as 31 out of 372 appointments).
42. See Goldman, Reagan 'sJudicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 318.
43. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 319.
44. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 321. In particular, 5.9% of
Reagan's district court judges came from 100+ lawyer law firms. This compares to
2% for the Carter Administration, 1.9% for the Ford Administration, 0.6% for the
Nixon Administration, and 0.8% for the Johnson Administration. Goldman notes
that Reagan made three times the proportion of his appointments from very large law
firms compared to the Carter administration. For Court of Appeals appointments,
Reagan appointed the highest percentage from 100+ lawyer law firms--in particular,
3.9% compared to Carter's 1.8% and 0% for the Ford, Nixon, and Johnson Admini-
strations. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 324. These
statistics might well reflect the rise in number of large law firms in the United States.
45. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 322. Carter appointed many
district judges who were publicly educated. This was offset by the high percentage of
Ivy League judges whom Carter appointed to the Courts of Appeals. See Goldman,
Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 324.
46. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 322.
47. Goldman, Reagan's JudicialLegacy, supra note 25, at 322.
48. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 325.
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Also, because of Reagan's ideological emphasis, the women he
did appoint were from a fairly uniform background. Ninety-seven
percent of the women Reagan appointed had prior judicial or prose-
cutorial experience.49 This allowed Reagan to assess these candidates'
ideologies based on their judicial or prosecutorial track records.50
Drawing from a rather small sample size, one political scientist com-
pared attitudes of Reagan's first term female appointees to those of
Carter's female appointees. 5' That study showed that Carter-appointed
women had different attitudes on several key women's issues as com-
pared to Reagan appointees. For example, 95 percent of Carter
appointees supported the women's movement, whereas as only 37.5
percent of Reagan's appointees did. In addition, almost 75 percent of
Carter appointees disagreed with the assertion that it is impossible to
combine a career with motherhood, whereas only 57.1 percent of
Reagan appointees disagreed.52 While it may be unfair to read too
much into these statistics because of the small number of female
judges appointed by Reagan (only eight responded, which amounted
to 73 percent of Reagan's female appointees during his first term),
other studies have suggested that Reagan-appointed women judges
were even less supportive of the women's movement than Republican
women politicians. 53 This suggests that diversity is a much more com-
plex calculus, requiring consideration of a judicial candidate's
background in order to attain more complete diversity. Indeed, this
evidence suggests that Reagan successfully appointed conservative
women who would not diversify the bench in the same manner that
Carter's appointees did.
Finally, another striking characteristic of Reagan's appointees is
their wealth. Reagan appointed sixty-seven millionaires to the federal
49. See Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and
Carter Administrations, 71 JUDICATURE 136, 141 (1987) [hereinafter Martin, Gen-
der].
50. See Martin, Gender, supra note 49.
51. See Martin, Gender, supra note 49.
52. See Martin, Gender, supra note 49, at 142. Martin cautions not to "read too much
into these responses," in part because of the small sample size of Reagan judges-only
eight. Martin, Gender, supra note 49, at 142.
53. See Martin, Gender, supra note 49 (citing and discussing CARROLL, WOMEN AS CAN-
DIDATES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1985)).
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courts." Only fifty-one of his judicial appointees made less than
$200,000 per year. The vast majority made over this amount."
C. The Bush Administration
Like Reagan, President Bush looked for judges with a conserva-
tive ideology. At first the Bush Administration's appointment record
on diversity appeared much like that of the Reagan Administration.
During his first two years in office, Bush appointed women to only
seven out of sixty-eight judicial openings.56 However, unlike Reagan,
President Bush made a commitment to diversity on the bench and
eventually appointed an unprecedented percentage of women.57 In the
district courts, he began slowly. During the first two years of his
presidency, he appointed 10.4 percent women. However, by his sec-
ond two years, that percentage rose to 24 percent.58 The net effect was
that Bush appointed thirty-six out of 192 judges who were women, or
18.7 percent of his judicial appointments. 9 In addition, Bush ap-
pointed a higher percentage of African American judges than Reagan
and a larger percentage of Hispanic judges to the Court of Appeals
54. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 321.
55. See Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy, supra note 25, at 321.
56. See Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 11, at 1238.
57. Although Bush's numbers look good, there are a number of factors that make his
appointment of women less impressive. For example, there were many more women
lawyers (20% of all lawyers) during the Bush Administration than during the Carter
Administration (only 7%) from which to choose. See Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap,
supra note 11, at 1240-41. In addition, a significant number of Bush's appointments
involved the elevation of female district court judges to appellate levels, whereas this
accounted for only one of President Carter's appointees. See Tobias, Closing the Gen-
der Gap, supra note 11, at 1240-41. Almost one-third of his female judges were
selected in the seven month period following the difficult Clarence Thomas nomina-
tion hearings, and half of his female appointments came during the year he ran for re-
election. See Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 11 at 1241. This suggests
that his appointment of women was based more on political expedience than a true
commitment to diversity. See Goldman, Bush' Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 290
(suggesting that Bush appointed women to counteract alienation of women from his
administration due to the Thomas/Hill hearings).
58. See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 286.
59. See Goldman, Bush' Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 286; Federal Judicial History
Office, Women Judges as Percentage, supra note 18; (noting the number as 37 out of
196, or 18.9%). Another source stated that Bush appointed 185 judges-37 court of
appeals judges and 148 district court judges. See Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting
Behavior ofJudges Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDIcATuRE 298, 301 (1993).
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
than even President Carter.60 On racial diversity, overall Bush fared
slightly better than Reagan, but not as well as Carter. Of his district
court appointments, 89.2 percent were white. 1
Bush's appointees are educationally mixed. While a majority of
his district court appointees went to private undergraduate institu-
tions, a majority went to public law schools. 2 This compares to
Carter's district court appointees, a majority of whom went to public
law schools and public undergraduate institutions. 3
In spite of gains in diversity as compared to his immediate prede-
cessor, Bush's approach to judicial selection was very similar to that of
President Reagan. Bush increased Reagan's trend of appointing
judges from large law firms. Almost 11 percent of Bush's district court
appointees were from such firms.65 Both presidents sought judges who
were ideologically conservative. As one scholar put it, in the Bush
Administration "[1]iberal activists in the tradition of Earl Warren,
William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall were not welcome." 67 In
addition, Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed only six women to
the Courts of Appeals. 61 Like Reagan, Bush appointed many wealthy
judges--43.2 percent of Bush's court of appeals appointments went to
60. See Goldman, Bushs Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 293. However, Carter ap-
pointed the highest percentage of Hispanics to the district courts. See Goldman,
Bush sJudicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 287. In addition, Reagan appointed a higher
percentage of Hispanics than Bush to the district courts. See Goldman, Bushs Judal
Legacy, supra note 30, at 287.
61. See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 287.
62. See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 287.
63. See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 287. By this statement, I do
not mean that they went to both a public undergraduate school and law school. The
statistics do not set out the combination. So, a Carter appointee might have gone to a
public undergraduate institution and a private law school. The upshot is that a ma-
jority of Carter's judges had public school experience, either in law school or
undergraduate school, whereas the same can only be said of Bush's appointees with
respect to law school.
64. See Tobias, The Gender Gap, supra note 11, at 173.
65. See Goldman, Bush'sJudicialLegacy, supra note 30, at 287.
66. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDIcIAL RouLEra 60 (1988)(describing the Reagan Ad-
ministration's efforts); Carp et al., supra note 59, at 301; Douglas M. Kmiec, Judicial
Selection and the Pursuit ofJustice: the Unsettled Relationship Between Law and Moral-
ity, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989); Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap, supra note 11,
at 173; Yvette M. Barksdale, Advice and Consent, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1399,
1409 (1997)("Presidents Reagan and Bush sought to pack the Court with conserva-
tives at the expense of those to the left and center.").
67. Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 296.
68. See Songer et al., supra note 18, at 425.
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millionaires.69 The Judgeships Act of 1990 allowed Bush to appoint
seventy-four new district court and eleven new court of appeals
judges. 70 All in all, Bush appointed 148 district court judges and
thirty-seven court of appeals judges.7' At the end of his presidency,
181 of Bush's appointees remained on the bench.72
D. The Clinton Administration
At the time President Clinton took office, only about one in five
district court judges and one in four appeals courts judges were ap-
pointees of Democratic presidents. 73 However, there were many
vacancies in the judiciary. 74 President Clinton vowed to increase gen-
der and racial diversity on the federal bench.75 Unlike his two
immediate predecessors, Clinton did not set out with an ideological
agenda,76 although he did note that he would seek judges who were
committed to enforcing constitutional rights.7 During President
Clinton's first term, approximately 30 percent of his federal judicial
appointees were women 78 and 28 percent were minorities. 79 All in all,
over half of President Clinton's first-term appointments were
69. See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 293.
70. See Carp et al., supra note 59, at 301.
71. See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 286, 292. There is some dis-
crepancy in the statistics. See supra note 59.
72. See Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 296.
73. See Goldman, Bushs Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 297.
74. See Goldman, Bushs Judicial Legacy, supra note 30, at 297 (85 district court judge-
ships and 15 court of appeals judgeships). Carl Tobias puts that number at 113 total
judicial openings at the time of Clinton's inauguration. Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance
on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. Rtv. 935, 946 (1998) [hereinafter Tobias, Fos-
tering Balance].
75. See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 741, 742 (1997) [hereinafter Tobias, Choosing]; Tobias,
Fostering Balance, supra note 74, at 936-37.
76. See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges
to Cross, 80 JUDICAruan 254, 256 (1997).
77. See Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance, supra note 74, at 936.
78. See Federal Judicial History Office, Women Judges as Percentage, supra note 18 (61
out of 206 appointments went to women); see also Tobias, Choosing, supra note 74, at
745 (noting the percentage of women as 31% of appointments); Goldman & Slot-
nick, supra note 76, at 261 (noting percentage of women as 30.2%).
79. See Tobias, Fostering Balance, supra note 74, at 950; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note
76, at 261 (noting percentage of minority appointees, including African American,
Hispanic, Asian American, and Native American, as 27.8%).
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non-traditional, i.e., women and minorities." By the end of his first
term, President Clinton had appointed nearly twice as many female
judges as President Reagan, with a little more than half as many judi-
cial appointments as Reagan. 8 He did this without sacrificing quality:
"President Clinton's first-term appointees also earned the highest rat-
ings assigned by the ABA since it began evaluating candidates'
qualifications in the 195Os.82
Clinton's appointees are different in other ways as well. A much
higher proportion of Clinton's non-traditional appointees have come
from public sector employment either as government lawyers, judges,
or lawyers in politics.8 3 Compared to his three predecessors, during the
first term of his presidency, Clinton appointed the highest percentage
of Ivy League graduates to the bench. 84 During his first term, com-
pared to President Carter, Clinton appointed a higher proportion of
millionaires and nearly tied the percentage of President Bush.85 Inter-
estingly, Clinton's millionaires were concentrated in his non-
traditional appointee ranks. "Half of the nontraditional appointees
were millionaires but less than one fourth of the traditional appointees
were in that income bracket."86
Giveh the wealth of Clinton's non-traditional appointees, it is
not terribly surprising that he has been criticized for not appointing
more politically partisan judges. While he has made significant strides
in terms of diversifying the federal bench with respect to gender and
race, some commentators have criticized President Clinton's ap-
pointments for not being liberal enough to offset the effects of the
80. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 258, 261 (noting that only 47.3% of
Clinton's appointees were white males).
81. See Federal Judicial History Office, Women Judges as Percentages, supra note 18 (of
206 appointments, Clinton gave 61 to women; out of 399 appointments, Reagan
gave 33 to women).
82. Tobias, Fostering Balance, supra note 74, at 950 (footnote omitted).
83. See Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Saronson, Clinton's Nontraditional Judges:
Creating A More Representative Bench, 78 JUDICATUaS 68, 70 (1994); Goldman &
Slotnick, supra note 76, at 258-59.
84. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 261.
85. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 266. 32.4% of President Bush's appoint-
ees were millionaires, whereas 32.0% of Clinton's appointees were millionaires.
These percentages are higher than those of both Reagan and Carter. Only 4% of
Carter's appointees were millionaires. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at
266.
86. Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 271.
[Vol. 6:113
DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH
Reagan/Bush appointees. 7 Clinton's appointees are not as diverse in
other ways-for example, in wealth-as Carter's appointees. The
104th and 105th Congresses, which were dominated by a Republican
majority, hampered Clinton's efforts.8 8 Thus, Clinton may have felt
forced to appoint more moderate judges to assure confirmation.
Presidential politics played a role in the end of his first term.89 Bob
Dole, Clinton's opponent during that election year, was responsible
for much delay in the appointment process.90 Being the most recent
appointees, Clinton judges have not yet been able to establish a
meaningful voting record for purposes of study by political scientists.9
If the nomination process had not been stalled, it was initially esti-
mated that President Clinton could have nominated half of all sitting
federal judges.92
As of February 1998, there were still eighty-two federal judge-
ships vacant.93 In addition, "Congress has authorized 179 active judges
for the United States Courts of Appeals and 649 active judges for the
United States District Courts."94 Because each year judges retire, leave
office, or take senior status, the current demographics of the federal
judiciary are difficult to determine precisely.
The effect of twelve years of Republican administrations on the
judiciary will linger well beyond the Clinton Administration. The ju-
dicial legacy of a president lasts well beyond his presidency. For
example, an examination done by Sheldon Goldman at the end of the
Bush Administration showed that half of Lyndon Johnson's appoint-
ees were still in judicial office twenty-four years after his presidency,
87. See Tobias, Choosing, supra note 75, at 746.
88. See Goldman & Slomick, supra note 76, at 255, 257-58.
89. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76.
90. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 257-58, 271-72.
91. See generally Tobias, Choosing, supra note 75, at 746 (noting that it is too early to
conclude what type of judicial service Clinton appointees will render). Recently, po-
litical scientist Jennifer A. Segal examined decision making by some Clinton
appointees and discovered some differences running along race and sex lines. See Jen-
nifer A. Segal, The Decision Making of Clinton's Nontraditional Judicial Appointees, 80
JUDicATURE 279 (1997). For more on Segal's study, see infra notes 160 to 163 and
accompanying text.
92. See Editorial, Jan. 23, 1997 ST. PETERSBURG TimEs 14A.
93. See Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EM-
ORY L.J. 527, 527 (1998) [hereinafter Tobias, FederalJudicialSelection.]
94. Tobias, FederaI Judicial Selection, supra note 93, at 527.
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although the majority were on senior status.9" Twelve years after his
presidency, nine out of ten Carter appointees were still on the bench,
while two-thirds were in active service. 96 Thus, even though the coun-
try is in the midst of a Democratic administration, the effects of
appointments by both Presidents Bush and Reagan will be long felt.97
II. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF DIVERSITY
Having assessed the status of diversity on the bench, we can con-
sider the fundamental question of whether diversity is having or will
have any effects on real cases. While the reliability of these studies is
open to some debate, 9 political scientists and the occasional legal
scholar have measured the effects of diversity, where palpable.99 More
recently, the gender bias task force movement-has shed light on the
potential effects of diversity on the bench.
A. The Theories Behind the Studies
Social scientists and, in particular, political scientists have been
tracking the voting patterns and the demographic make-up of both the
state and federal judiciaries for some time now. They have tried to explain
how factors such as political inclination (i.e. conservative or liberal),00
95. See Sheldon Goldman, How Long the Legacy? 76 JUDICATURE 295, 295 (1993)
[hereinafter Goldman, How Long].
96. See Goldman, How Long, supra note 95, at 295.
97. Interestingly, Clinton's non-traditional appointees during his first sixteen months in
office were, on average, six years younger than his traditional appointees. See Gold-
man & Saronson, supra note 83, at 71. This means that Clinton's non-traditional
judges in particular may have more of an opportunity to have an impact on the
bench.
98. See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 13, at 263-65.
99. In some instances, there simply have not been enough women or minorities on the
bench to have a large enough sample to analyze.
100. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. Rav. 557, 558 (1989)(describing studies
involving differences between liberal and conservative judges).
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political party,01 appointing president,10 2 race,'03 religion,'O° gender,05
and region of the country' 6 affect judicial decision making. Legal
scholars, who are to a large extent wedded to the legal method,' 7 have
on occasion addressed some of the arguments of political scientists.
This section discusses both the findings of political scientists and re-
sponses of legal scholars. It is not my purpose to provide a thorough
analysis of the political science/legal theory debate, but instead to give
a general description and criticism of the political science models so
that we can better evaluate and understand studies assessing the effects
of diversity.
101. See C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 355, 360 (1981)(citing studies correlating political party identifi-
cation to voting behavior); Davis, supra note 26, at 332 ("Voting behavior research
has demonstrated that judges' political party affiliation is a predictor of voting pat-
terns insofar as Democrats tend to be more liberal than Republicans."); Ronald
Stidham et al. Women's Rights Before the Federal District Courts, 1971-1977, 11 AM.
POL. Q. 205, 216 (1983).
102. See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DisTsucr CouRTs 46 (1996)(pointing out that federal district judges appointed by
Democratic presidents are more liberal than their Republican counterparts); Carp et
al., supra note 59 (evaluating liberal/conservative voting habits of Bush appointees on
several topics); Davis, supra note 26, at 333-334 (showing Carter appointees were
more liberal than Johnson appointees); Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legaq, supra note
30; Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empiri-
cal Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation,
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073, 1171-1178 (1992)(Iaw professor and sociologist conduct-
ing study of particular Title VII defense); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R.
Hensley, Unfifilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and
Bush, 57 ALE. L. REv. 1111 (1994); Tate, supra note 101, at 360 (citing and de-
scribing such studies).
103. See Gottschall, supra note 27 (measuring the differences between Carter's African
American and white appointees to the Courts of Appeals); Walker & Barrow, supra
note 26, at 599-600 (recounting several studies).
104. See Tate, supra note 101, at 358 (discussing studies correlating religion to voting
behavior in civil liberties and economics cases).
105. See, e.g., Martin, Men and Women, supra note 22; Songer et al., supra note 18.
106. See Stidham et al., supra note 101, at 210 (documenting differences in liberality be-
tween northern and southern judges on racial minority discrimination cases); Tate,
supra note 101, at 362 (Supreme Court Justices).
107. I use "legal method" to indicate the neutral application of legal doctrine, whether it
be as announced in case law or statute, to the facts of a given case. For more on this
distinction, see generally George, supra note 21, at 1642-44.
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Political science research on the judiciary has placed increasing
emphasis on what has become known as the "attitudinal model."" 8
This model accounts for judicial decision making based not on the
neutral application of judicial precedent, but instead on "each judge's
political ideology and the identity of the parties."' 9 This theory is
consistent with both the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") and Legal Re-
alism movements in legal philosophy, although these schools have
been criticized as being anecdotal in nature and unsupported by re-
search of any real rigor. ° Attitudinal political science scholars have
attempted to prove their model by applying scientific methods to ju-
dicial decision making.' There is a significant body of political
science research supporting the attitudinal model of decision making
at least at the United States Supreme Court level."
2
How might diversity interact with the attitudinal model? If a
judge's political ideology is shaped in part by his or her life experi-
ences, the attitudinal model, if proven, might suggest that a diverse
bench would lead to judges of diverse ideology. If a female judge, for
example, understands the world in part based on her experiences as a
female, this aspect of her "ideology" should be expressed through her
decision making. While attitudinal scholars have focused their atten-
tion on political ideology, factoring in whether a judge is a Democrat
or Republican, ideologically conservative or liberal, or appointed by a
Democratic or Republican president, they are beginning to focus on
other background factors, such as race and sex. Their research in this
area has been hampered in the past by the small number of non-white
male judges, making it difficult to have statistically adequate sample
sizes. However, as more and more women and people of color have
been appointed, the potential for this research to bear fruit has in-
creased.
Political scientist Elaine Martin provides an example of what
sorts of differences in outlook might arise based on the sex of the
judge. Martin conducted a mail-out survey of Carter-appointed fed-
108. See RowLAND & CAR, supra note 102, at 138-141 (describing the attitudinal model);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrnTUDI-
NA. MODEL (1993); Cross, supra note 13 (describing the attitudinal model and its
genesis); George, supra note 21, at 1646-1655 (describing the development and cur-
rent attitudinal model); Segal & Cover, supra note 100.
109. Cross, supra note 13, at 265.
110. See Cross, supra note 13, at 274-75.
111. See Cross, supra note 13, at 275.
112. See Cross, supra note 13, at 275-279 (discussing various studies).
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eral judges to ascertain whether female and male judges bring different
perspectives, based on their life experiences, to the bench."' Her study
revealed the interesting and often differing perspectives of male and
female Carter-appointees. For example, although relatively few of the
judges felt a conflict between their career and parenting roles, ' a
majority of women judges (62.9 percent) sometimes or frequently felt
conflict when their children were younger, whereas a majority of men
(52.9 percent) rarely felt such a conflict." Further, though engaged in
the prestigious and time-consuming positions of federal judges, nearly
two-thirds of the female judges responding stated that they took pri-
mary responsibility for running their households." 6 Tellingly, in
describing their "major" problems in law, 81 percent of the women
judges surveyed answered by mentioning sex discrimination, whereas
only 18.5 percent of men referred to some racial or class-based bias."
7
Martin catalogues the way these differences in perspective might
manifest themselves in the role these women play as judges:
113. See Martin, Men and Women, supra note 22. This is a "soft" data approach to politi-
cal science research into the judiciary. There has been considerable debate among
political science scholars regarding the value of such "soft" approaches, such as inter-
viewing judges, as opposed to the "hard" evidence approach, i.e., evaluating the
outcomes of cases. There are several interesting articles on this subject. For examples
of articles discussing this see, e.g., Lee Epstein, Interviewing U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tices and Interest Group Attorneys, 73 JUDICATURE 196 (1990); John B. Gates, Content
Analysis: Possibilities and Limits for Qualitative Data, 73 JUDICATURE 202 (1990);
Milton Heumann, Interviewing TrialJudges, 73 JUDICATURE 200 (1990); Charles A.
Johnson, Strategies for Judicial Research: Soaking and Poking in the Judiciary, 73 JUDI-
cATuRE 192 (1990); H.W. Perry, Jr., Interviewing Supreme Court Personne 73
JUDICATURE 199 (1990); S. Sidney Ulmer, Further Reflections on Working in the Pa-
pers ofSupreme Court Justices, 73 JUDICATURE 193 (1990).
114. Martin reported that 12.8% of men and 21.4% of women either "sometimes" or
"frequently" felt conflict between their career and parental roles. See Martin, Men and
Women, supra note 22, at 205.
115. See Martin, Men and Women, supra note 22, at 205.
116. See Martin, Men and Women, supra note 22, at 206. As Martin put it,
[Tihe women judges appointed by Carter appear to have faced many of the
same conflicts in combining family and career as other women. In addition
to overcoming greater conflicts between their family and career roles than
their male colleagues during the early part of their careers, women judges
in this study continue to carry a much heavier burden for the maintenance
and operation of their households.
Martin, Men and Women, supra note 22, at 206.
117. See Martin, Men and Women, supra note 22, at 207.
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Their differences might influence such things as decisional
output, especially in cases involving sex discrimination; con-
duct of courtroom business, especially as regards sexist
behavior by litigators; influence on sex-role attitudes held by
their male colleagues, especially on appellate courts where
decisions are collegial; administrative behavior, for example,
in hiring women law clerks; and as noted in the introduc-
tion, collective actions, through formal organizations,
undertaken to heighten the judicial system's response to
gender bias problems in both law and process."'
Thus, because of their differing life experiences with sex discrimina-
tion at work and responsibility for their households, women judges
might have a very different view on particular cases and the function-
ing of the judiciary generally.
Legal scholars have criticized the political science approach as ap-
plied to judicial decision making."' Not surprisingly, many judges
have disavowed it as an explanation of judicial decision making.20 The
main critique has been that political scientists are either unable to or
simply do not take into account the internal workings of the legal
118. See Martin, Men and Women, supra note 22, at 208.
119. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 13, at 280-81.
120. See, e.g., ROWLAND & CAm.p, supra note 102, at 147 ("federal trial judges, including
those with activist reputations, persistently and adamantly deny that their fact-finding
or legal interpretations are motivated by their personal policy preferences"); Harry T.
Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" ofJudging: Dispelling Some
Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 619, 620 (1985); George, supra
note 21, at 1695 ("Most judges believe they are dassicists and go to great lengths to
explain their decisions by reference to existing law."); Jon A. Newman, Between Legal
Realism and Neutral Principes: The Legitimacy ofInstitutional Values, 72 CAL. L. Rtv.
200, 203 (1984). However, several female judges have acknowledged that female
judges bring different perspectives to the bench. Justice Christine Durham, of the
Utah Supreme Court, explained that women judges "bring an individual and collec-
tive perspective to our work that cannot be achieved in a system which reflects the
experience of only a part of the people whose lives it affects." Christine Durham,
President's Column, 8 NAWJ NEws AND ANNOUNCEMENTS 1, 3 (1987); see also
Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 489, 492-96 (1984). In addition, New York State Court of Appeals
Judge Judith S. Kaye has explained that "[a]fter a lifetime of different experiences and
a substantial period of survival in a male-dominated profession, women judges un-
questionably have developed a heightened awareness of the problems that other
women encounter in life and in law; it is not at all surprising that they remain par-
ticularly sensitive to these problems." Marion Zenn Goldberg, Carter-Appointed
Judges: Perspectives on Gender, 26 TRLAL 108 (April 1990).
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system itself.121 Scholars also argue that the attitudinal model is too
selective in its field of study. For example, most studies focus on Su-
preme Court decision making in controversial civil rights, civil
liberties, and criminal cases.'22 Finally, attitudinal scholars identify
particular outcomes as "liberal" and "conservative," without a way to
control for the effects of the legal model on the outcome of the deci-
sion. '2
In a similar vein, law professors Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart
Schwab and economist Orley Ashenfelter have criticized the work of
political scientists in assessing outcomes of cases based on a judge's
political party or appointing president.'24 By looking at federal trial
dockets, they analyzed case outcomes and argued that such character-
istics are not predictors of outcomes in the vast majority of cases.
Indeed, they "interpret [their] results as evidence that the individual
judge has more modest influence on the outcome of the mass of cases
than on the subset of cases leading to published opinions."
125
This is not all that surprising. Generally if the outcome of a case
is fairly clear, the parties will settle. Difficult cases-in which there are
credible facts on both sides of the case and/or difficult questions of
law-are more likely to result in a published opinion at the district
court level. It is in these cases that the influence of the judge is most
likely to be seen. For example, a judge's ideological predisposition is
more likely to be reflected in ground breaking precedent-where the
judge is writing on a clean slate. 26 While this may not have an effect
in the vast majority of cases, it may have greater influence on future
decisions. These are very important judicial decisions because they set
precedent for other courts to obey or, at least, by which to be influ-
enced. Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab acknowledge this
perspective in their article, but do not account for its impact in their
121. See Cross, supra note 13, at 280-81.
122. See Cross, supra note 13, at 285.
123. See Cross, supra note 13, at 292.
124. See Ashenfelter et al., supra note 13.
125. See Ashenfelter et al., supra note 13, at 260; see also PHiLUP COOPER, HARD JUDICA.
CHOiCES 328 '(1988)(Cooper's study of trial judges in remediation cases "indicates
that the judges in these cases were by and large more defensive in approach, more in-
terested in resolving cases than in reforming all the ills of American society").
126. See George, supra note 21, at 1667 (citing and quoting Beverly Blair Cook, Sentenc-
ing Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft Cases-1972, 42 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 597, 597
(1973)).
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study, instead choosing to emphasize the outcomes in all cases.121
However, given that approximately twenty-one to twenty-six percent,
for example, of non-prisoner civil rights decisions are actually ap-
pealed,'28 their study is important in assessing how the "average" case
is resolved and tends to undermine the attitudinal model in the con-
text of district court cases. Indeed, by focusing on the United States
Supreme Court, social scientists certainly fail to tell the whole story,
especially given that the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only four
percent of the cases in which it is requested. 129
Recently, political scientists themselves have begun to question
the applicability of the attitudinal model-at least in the case of dis-
trict court decision making. 130 C.K. Rowland and Robert A. Carp have
argued that social scientists' emphasis on votes comes at the price of
ignoring the process of decision making itself, including evaluating
the facts, interpreting the law, and applying that law to the facts of
that case.131
George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein have taken a slightly differ-
ent approach, developing a selection theory of litigation. 3 2 Priest and
Klein argue that litigants will take the attitude of the judge into ac-
count in deciding whether to settle a case or try it. Thus, in actual
cases that are tried, ideology should not be reflected in the actual out-
come of the decision, because if the judge's ideology would clearly
affect the outcome, the parties would settle accordingly.' Priest and
Klein's research is based on contract and negligence actions, rather
than the more controversial and more ideology-implicating civil rights
127. SeeAshenfelter et al., supra note 13, at 263, 281.
128. It is difficult to determine the rate of appeals from federal trial court decisions. In a
study from 1995, Krafka, Cecil and Lombard approximated that 21-26% of non-
prisoner civil rights cases were appealed from 1986 through 1993. CAROL KRwKA ET
AL., STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE RATE OF FEDERAL CrviL A 'PEALS 29 (1995).
The rate of civil appeals is growing and generally far outpaces the growth in criminal
appeals. See KwANKA ET AL., supra, at 1-3. In 1993, 19% of appeals filed were in non-
prisoner civil rights cases. See KRASKA ET AL., supra, at 10.
129. See Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the "Mini-Supreme
Court," 13 J.L. & PoL'y. 377, 407 (1997); but see George, supra note 21, at 1677
(citing LE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPRFME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS,
AND DEvELOPmnNTS 81-83 (2d ed. 1996))(stating that the rate is 7.3%).
130. See ROWLAND & CA,, supra note 102, at 148-50.
131. See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 102, at 149.
132. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 1 (1984). If this theory is accurate, this should have an effect on the
studies of political scientists, which emphasize published decisions.
133. See Priest & Klein, supra note 132, at 34-36.
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cases that political scientists tend to study.'3 Priest and Klein's theory
has more than facial appeal; there is no doubt, as evidenced by publi-
cations such as Almanac of the Federal Judiciary,' that practitioners
want to know who their judges are and believe that this information is
relevant to their clients' cases.
In contrast, Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson found no sup-
port for Priest and Klein's selection-effects hypothesis in their study of
the lack of interest defense used in Title VII cases. "Contrary to its
predictions, judges' decisions on the lack of interest issue vary sub-
stantially depending on their political affiliations.' 3 6 Schultz and
Petterson's examination of cases showed that "judges appointed by
Democratic presidents were significantly more likely to vote for
plaintiffs than those appointed by Republicans." 1
37
More recently, some political scientists have begun to incorporate
the effects of institutional structures on judicial decision making, us-
ing what has been dubbed the "strategic theory" of judicial behavior.
Scholars using this theory, while acknowledging that judges attempt
to further their own policy goals, argue that judges are also influenced
by other "strategic factors, such as interactions with colleagues on the
Court (internal dynamics) and reactions to the positions of other
134. See Priest & Klein, supra note 132, at 35-36.
135. ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1998)(containing profiles of federal judges,
including sections on education, writing, other employment, professional associa-
tions, as well as lawyers' anecdotal evaluations of each member of the federal
judiciary). Indeed, as a practicing litigator, one of the first things I did in any case was
seek out information about the trial judge to help assess my client's chances of suc-
cess.
136. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 102, at 1171-72. The lack of interest defense is char-
acterized by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck &
Company 839 F.2d 302, 312-21 (7th Cir. 1988). In that case, Sears argued that the
lack of women in higher-paying commission sales positions was not due to any dis-
crimination by Sears, but was in fact the result of a lack of interest on the part of
women in such high stress jobs.
137. Schultz & Petterson, supra note 102, at 1172. The one exception in the study was
Reagan appointees, who voted for sex discrimination plaintiffs on the lack of interest
argument only slightly less frequently than Carter appointees. See Scholtz & Petter-
son, supra note 102, at 1172. Schultz and Petterson were less confident of this result,
in part because they studied only five Reagan appointees in reaching this conclusion.
See Scholtz & Petterson, supra note 102, at 1172. Interestingly, in race discrimina-
don cases, Schultz and Petterson did not find that Democratic president appointees
were more likely to side with the plaintiff when faced with a lack of interest argument
by the defense. See Scholtz & Petterson, supra note 102, at 1177-78. Indeed, they
found that Carter appointees actually had the worst record for siding with race dis-
crimination plaintiffs in this context.
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institutional actors (external forces), and of institutional structure on
the justices' final decisions. " "' For example, a judge might support a
particular outcome even though it is not her most preferred, in order
to stop a majority from forming on an even less preferred outcome.
Based on theories of rational or public choice, "the strategic model
suggests that Supreme Court justices are constrained by the behavior
of their brethren or actors external to the Court. 1 39 Although this
model has been used mostly to describe Supreme Court decision
making, it is beginning to be used in an effort to account for decisions
by the Courts of Appeals.4 George found, in her study of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, that while many
judges did vote based on an attitudinal model, some did employ a
more Strategic approach; that is, they were influenced by what the
majority of their colleagues did or the political shift of the United
States Supreme Court.14 ' However, the strategic approach appears less
applicable to decisions by district courts, which lack panel interac-
tion-although other forces, such as the potential for reversal on
appeal, may influence a judge's decision in a case.4
The strategic model, at least in appellate court decision making,
recognizes the influence of simply having a woman or person of color
on the panel. This might make a fellow judge reconsider his or her
position on a particular issue in two ways. First, being confronted
with a woman judge across the table when the court is ruling on an
issue of, for example, sex discrimination, may quiet some sexist
thoughts that might have found expression during discussion of the
case. While some might not applaud such a chilling effect, a first step
in sensitizing people to the feelings or legal predicaments of others is
for them to learn what might offend others. Second, the participation
of. non-traditional members with firsthand knowledge of discrimina-
tion might influence fellow judges in discussions involving issues of
138. George, supra note 21, at 1655-56.
139. George, supra note 21, at 1658-59 (quoting James F. Spriggs, II et al., The Process of
Bargaining and Accommodation on the U.S. Supreme Court (unpublished paper, pre-
sented at the 1997 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago)).
140. See George, supra note 21, at 1665-94 (applying the strategic model to the 4th Cir-
cuit's en banc decision making).
141. See George, supra note 21, at 1686-94.
142. See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 102, at 137-38 (criticizing organizational model's
applicability to district courts).
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race or gender because these judges might be more persuasive on the
issue and lend credibility to the plaintiffs case.
B. Evidence of the Effects of Gender and Race
While there seems to be increasing skepticism with respect to the
attitudinal model, it is the model most employed in assessing the ef-
fects of diversity on the bench in judicial decision making. Looking at
studies that actually measure the effects of race or gender of the judge
on the outcome of decision making shows mixed effects based on di-
versity. Early political scientists' studies on gender difference were
inconclusive, often showing little difference between the voting pat-
terns of male and female judges.,43 With the exception perhaps of the
sentencing of female defendants in criminal cases,14 studies conducted
in the late 1970s and early 1980s showed that there was no difference
in the voting of male and female judges. There were similar results in
studies involving race, with the exception of two studies of the United
States Court of Appeals in the early 1980s.14
As recently as 1985, Thomas G. Walker and Deborah J. Barrow
published a study that tended to show little difference between the
voting behaviors of male and female judges as well as between white
and African American judges.' The comparison in this study was
143. See Martin, Men and Woman, supra note 22, at 208 (detailing studies prior to 1990);
see also Segal, supra note 91, at 279 (noting effects of race or sex are unclear).
144. Interestingly, one study found that female judges were actually tougher in sentencing
female defendants than male judges. The authors of that study attributed the differ-
ence to male paternalism in which female judges did not engage. See John Gruhl et
al., Women as Poliaymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 Am. J. POL. Sci. 308 (1981).
However, an earlier study of a city's judges found no significant difference between
male and female judges in sentencing female defendants. See Herbert M. Kritzer &
Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in
Criminal Case Disposition, 14 Soc. Sci. J. 77, 83-84 (1977).
145. Walker and Barrow found a tendency by African American judges to favor defendants
in criminal cases. See Walker & Barrow, supra note 26, at 599-600; Gottschall
showed that African American Carter appointees favored criminal defendants at a
higher rate than white appointees and supported sex discrimination claimants at a
higher rate than their white male counterparts. GottschaU also found that white
males actually favored race discrimination daimants at a higher rate than African
American males. See Gottschall, supra note 27, at 172-73. Davis found no major dif-
ference between African American Carter appointees and white male Carter
appointees to the Courts of Appeals in several different types of cases. See Davis, su-
pra note 26, at 335.
146. See Walker & Barrow, supra note 26, passim.
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
among Carter-appointed district court judges. In one instance, the
authors found that female judges actually upheld the position of mi-
norities in fewer cases than male judges, were less liberal on personal
rights issues, and were more likely to rule for the government in fed-
eral regulatory disputes.117 Their conclusion did not support any
significant differences in decision making by groups under-
represented in the judiciary:
There is little in the evidence presented here to substantiate
the assertions made by either the supporters or the oppo-
nents of [judicial] affirmative action. The assumptions that
female and black judges will be more receptive to the de-
mands of the disadvantaged, more sympathetic to the policy
goals of women and minorities, and more liberal and activist
in the use of judicial power find no support in the decision-
making patterns of the judges studied. Similarly, claims that
women and blacks are not as qualified as white males and
that they lack the personal and professional authority to dis-
charge .the duties of a federal judgeship fall in light of the
behavior exhibited.'48
Walker and Barrow acknowledge the limitations of this study-
one significant factor being that many of the judges in the study had
limited voting records at the time of the study.'49 Although the
authors tried to eliminate the influence of other biases already docu-
mented (for example, they used only judges appointed by President
Carter), elimination of these biases may account for the lack of dis-
tinction between male and female judges as well as between white and
African American judges. For example, it does not come as a great
surprise that males appointed by Carter would have voting records
that are as sympathetic to women's issues as their female counterparts.
The result could simply suggest that factors other than sex (in this
case, the appointing president or the liberalism in general of the
judges appointed) played a more significant role in what influenced
the outcome of the cases.
Jon Gottschall, in his earlier study of voting behavior of Carter
appointees on the Courts of Appeals, did find some differences be-
147. See Walker & Barrow, supra note 26, at 608.
148. Walker & Barrow, supra note 26, at 614.
149. See Walker & Barrow, supra note 26, at 615.
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tween male and female judges as well as between white and African
American judges.'50 In particular, Gottschall found that women were
more pro-claimant in race and sex discrimination cases than their
male counterparts, although there was no meaningful difference in
criminal cases. 5' Gottschall found that race played a meaningful role
as well. African American males favored the criminal accused and
prisoners at a much higher rate than their white male counterparts."
2
African American males also voted in favor of sex discrimination
claimants at a higher rate than their white male counterparts. 53 Inter-
estingly, African American males did not vote in favor of race
discrimination claimants at as high a rate as their white male counter-
154parts.
More recent studies have begun to paint a different picture. At
least one study has shown that there is a statistically significant differ-
ence in the way in which male and female appellate judges evaluate
discrimination cases. 155 This study, published in 1993, found "[em]ore
than 63 percent of the votes cast by women judges supported the
plaintiffs claim of discrimination. In contrast, male judges supported
the plaintiff 46 percent of the time."156 Even when the statistics were
controlled for the political party of a judge's appointing president, the
difference persisted. Sixty-eight percent of Democrat-appointed fe-
male judges supported plaintiffs' claims, whereas 54.3% of Democrat-
appointed male judges supported plaintiffs' claims. The results for
Republican appointees were not statistically significant. 57 The authors
of the study suggested one possible explanation for these differences in
employment discrimination cases. "[Wlomen may tend to support the
150. See Gottschall, supra note 27, at 171-73 & tbl.5.
151. See Gottschall, supra note 27, at 171-72.
152. See Gottschall, supra note 27, at 172. African American male Carter appointees voted
for criminal defendants or prisoners 79% of the time, whereas white male appointees
voted for these individuals only 53% of the rime. See Gottschall, supra note 27, at
172 tbl.6.
153. See Gotschall, supra note 27, at 172. African American male Carter appointees voted
for sex discrimination claimants 65% of the time, whereas white male Carter ap-
pointees voted for sex discrimination plaintiffs 57% of the rime. See Gottschall, supra
note 27, at 172 tbl.6.
154. See Gottschall, supra note 27, at 172. Gottschall opined that this may be due to Afri-
can American judges' desire for "professional acceptance" and reluctance to appear
partisan on this issue. Gottschall, supra note 27, at 172-73.
155. See Davis et al., supra note 10, at 131-32.
156. See Davis et al., supra note 10, at 131 (footnote omitted).
157. See Davis et al., supra note 10, at 132 & tbl.5.
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claimant in employment discrimination cases simply because they are
likely to have experienced such discrimination directly, or have en-
countered gender-related obstacles in their professional lives, or feel a
close affinity with those who have."158 This is consistent with what
Professor Martin supposed from her survey.' Because some female
judges have experienced sex discrimination firsthand, they are more
sympathetic or perhaps have a greater understanding of the social
phenomenon that underlies such claims.
Most recently, political scientist Jennifer A. Segal examined deci-
sions of twenty-four Clinton appointees to the federal district courts
and found some distinctions in voting patterns based on race and
sex." 0 While she examined only a small number of cases, the outcome
of her study provides some insight into Clinton appointees. African
American judges supported the claims of African American plaintiffs
in fifty percent of their decisions, whereas their white counterparts
only did so in ten percent of their cases. In addition, African Ameri-
can judges were more supportive of the claims of women than their
white counterparts."' The study likewise found that female judges fa-
vor the claims of African American plaintiffs half of the time as
compared to their male counterparts who find for African Americans
only one-third of the time.'62 Interestingly, Segal noted no significant
differences in cases involving women's issues between male and female
judges in her sample." 3
Likewise, in a study of state supreme court justices, Allen and
Wall found that the majority of women justices that they studied 41
158. See Davis et al., supra note 10, at 133.
159. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
160. See Segal, supra note 91, at 279.
161. See Segal, supra note 91, at 279.
162. See Segal, supra note 91, at 279.
163. See Segal, supra note 91, at 279. Segal notes that the sample size-24 cases-was
decidedly small. See Segal, supra note 91, at 272.
164. See David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, Role Orientations and Women State Supreme
Court Justices, 77 JUDICATURE 156 (1993) [hereinafter Allen & Wall, Role Orienta-
tions]. This study was based on an analysis of voting by 24 female state supreme court
justices. Allen & Wall, Role Orientations, supra, at 159. In an earlier study of only 14
justices, Allen and Wall explained the problem of small sample size in this context.
They stated, "[w]e recognize the problem of generalizability in a sample of this size.
However, given the extraordinary minimal representation of women on state supreme
courts, any sample is bound to be small." Allen & Wall, Behavior, supra note 10, at
236 (emphais in original). Others have also criticized this study for its small sample
size. See Songer et al., supra note 18, at 427.
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exhibited "pro-woman" voting behavior on "women's issues." 65 As
they explained:
[T]he data in this study indicate that women justices per-
ceive a broad spectrum of women's issues as a single issue
dimension. Sex discrimination, sexual conduct and abuse,
medical malpractice, property settlements, and the relation-
ship between child and parent all appear to be viewed as
integral parts of an agenda. And while one study demon-
strates that the presence of a woman justice on a state
supreme court increases the number of pro-women sex dis-
crimination rulings, the research in the present study
indicates that even when the majority of the court opposes
an expansion of women's rights, female justices still hold to
their beliefs.' 66
165. See Allen & Wall, Behavior, supra note 10, at 239; see also Allen & Wall, Role Orien-
tations, supra note 164, at 165. Allen and Wall describe four role orientations
identified by researchers of judicial voting behaviors. One is the "representative role,"
in which the female decision maker (or office holder) "incorporates a woman's view-
point in legal matters directly impacting on women as a category." See Allen & Wall,
Role Orientations, supra note 164, at 158. Women also may act as "tokens," whereby
they "modify their behavior in order to conform to the dominant majority...." Al-
len & Wall, Role Orientations, supra note 164, at 158. Another possible role for
female justices is that of the "outsider," who "disregard[s] institutional traditions."
These women have characteristically high self esteem that allows them to break tradi-
tional norms. The result is that as judges, they "exhibit comparatively extreme voting
behavior." See Allen & Wall, Role Orientations, supra note 164, at 158-59. The
fourth role is that of the "different voice," based on the findings of differences be-
tween men and women by Carol Gilligan in her ground breaking book, In a Different
Voice. CAROL GILuGAN, IN A DIFFERENr VOICE (1982). Female jurists flling into
this role would place higher values on community and relational interests, as opposed
to individual rights. Research supporting this fourth category has had mixed results.
See Allen & Wall, Role Orientations, supra note 164, at 159; see also Davis et al., supra
note 10 (studying gender differences in the decision making of the federal courts of
appeals based on Gilligan's thesis). These differences between male and female judi-
cial behavior do not extend to all branches of the judiciary. Two studies of urban ttial
judges found no differences in sentencing patterns between male and female judges.
See Gruhl et al., supra note 144; Kritzer and Uhlman, supra note 144.
166. Allen & Wall, Role Orientations, supra note 164, at 161 (footnote omitted). Accord-
ing to this study, the extreme nature of a female justice's behavior is not a result of
political party affiliation. As Allen and Wall explain, "while a majority of women
Democratic justices serve on courts dominated by Democratic males, they still vote in
a manner substantially different from their same-party male colleagues." Allen &
Wall, Role Orientations, supra note 164, at 162. In criminal and economic cases, fe-
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Specifically in the context of sex discrimination cases, Gryski,
Main and Dixon have found that the presence of a female justice in-
creases the likelihood that a female plaintiff will prevail on her civil
claim.1
67
Songer, Davis & Haire conducted another study of federal ap-
pellate decision making in cases between 1981 and 1990 involving
three issues: (1) employment discrimination; (2) search and seizure;
and (3) obscenity. 68 In the obscenity and search and seizure cases
studied, the gender of the judge did not appear to play a part in deci-
sion making.69 Instead, the type of litigant and nature of the case facts
proved to be important predictors of the outcome of obscenity
cases. 70 The existence of a warrant, a finding of probable cause by the
trial court, or the trial court's finding that there was an exception to
the warrant requirement were predictive in search and seizure cases."
However, in the context of employment discrimination, the -gender of
the judge appeared to play a significant role in the case outcome.' 72
In 1971, Professors John Johnston and Charles Knapp published
the results of a study of judicial opinions in cases involving sex dis-
crimination.'73 Looking at a wide variety of judicial opinions and
protective legislation, Johnston and Knapp reviewed law over a
100-year period. Their conclusion was "that by and large the perform-
ance of American judges in the area of sex discrimination can be
succinctly described as ranging from poor to abominable."' 74 As the
professors concluded:
With some notable exceptions, they [judges] have failed to
bring to sex discrimination cases those judicial virtues of de-
tachment, reflection and critical analysis which have served
male Republican justices vote conservatively. See Allen & Wall, Role Orientations, su-
pra note 164, at 163. However, all female justices (regardless of party) tend to vote
more liberally on "women's issues." See Allen & Wall, Role Orientations, supra note
164, at 164.
167. See Gerard S. Gryski et al., Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex Dis-
crimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143, 153 (1986).
168. See Songer et al., supra note 18, at 429.
169. See Songer et al., supra note 18, at 433.
170. See Songer et al., supra note 18, at 432.
171. See Songer et al., supra note 18, at 433.
172. See Songer et al., supra note 18, at 434.
173. See John D. Johnston, Jr., & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study
inJudicialPerspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 675 (1971).
174. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 173, at 676.
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them so well with respect to other sensitive social issues.
Particularly striking, we believe, is the contrast between judi-
cial attitudes toward sex and race discrimination. Judges
have largely freed themselves from patterns of thought that
can be stigmatized as "racist"-at least their opinions in that
area exhibit a conscious attempt to free themselves from
habits of stereotypical thought with regard to discrimination
based on color. With respect to sex discrimination, however,
the story is different. "Sexism"-the making of unjustified
(or at least unsupported) assumptions about individual ca-
pabilities, interests, goals and social roles solely on the basis
of sex differences-is as easily discernible in contemporary
judicial opinions as racism ever was.175
Twenty-five years have passed since Johnston and Knapp's work.
Recent work in this area, however, suggests that judicial attitudes and
decision making in the sex discrimination area have not changed as
much as they should. 176 As Professor Robert J. Gregory recently stated,
"the case law reveals a judicial tolerance of sexual harassment that has
no analog in the area of racial harassment and which leaves working
women without the full protection of the law."'7 Gregory opines, as
have other scholars, that perhaps this is the result of too few female
judges on the bench.1
175. Johnston & Knapp, supra note 173, at 676 (emphasis in original).
176. In an article published last year, Robert J. Gregory uses two Seventh Circuit cases as
examples of how courts treat sex discrimination cases differently than race discrimi-
nation cases under Title VII, even though both types of cases involve identical legal
standards. As Gregory concludes:
In the race context, courts seem particularly receptive to claims that racially
harassing behavior has affected the terms or conditions of an individual's
employment, resolving any ambiguities in favor of the claimant and de-
emphasizing the need for any specific number of instances of harassment.
In the sex context, the judicial reaction seems less solicitous, with courts
more often stressing the ambiguities in the conduct at issue and the need
for repeated instances of harassing conduct.
Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a "Bitch"Just Don't Use the 'N-Word"' Some
Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v.
Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUt. L. Rav. 741, 742 (1997) (citations
omitted).
177. Gregory, supra note 176, at 743.
178. See Gregory, supra note 176 at 774 & n.208 (stating that as of 1994, 14% of federal
judges were women); see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the xas-
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Finally, one of the more interesting assessments of the potential
for women judges to bring a different viewpoint to the bench is Su-
zanna Sherry's article examining the decisions of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor on establishment clause and dis-
crimination cases. 17 Sherry relies on feminist psychology as well as
literary theory to hypothesize that women judges would emphasize
community and context as opposed to the atomized individuality that
is associated with a more masculine approach to constitutional analy-
sis."" Relying in large part on the work of Carol Gilligan,' 8" Sherry
tests her hypothesis by comparing and contrasting the decisions of the
two Justices during Justice O'Connor's first four years on the Su-
preme Court. 182 She concludes that in Establishment Clause cases,
O'Connor "is less willing to permit violations of what might be
termed intersubjective individual rights," i.e., those rights that tend to
deprive someone of full participation in the community. Likewise,
although less directly, O'Connor's decisions in the discrimination area
reflected "her greater sympathy for the victims of race or alienage dis-
crimination [as] part of a consistent pattern of protection of the value
of full membership in communities. " "'
Sherry notes a potential problem with characterizing Justice
O'Connor's voice as a "feminine" voice. O'Connor is still squarely in
the conservative camp of the Supreme Court on "most issues." Thus,
it could be argued that adding the feminine voice to adjudication does
not necessarily help change the outcomes of actual cases.'85 However,
Sherry argues that it could have other positive effects on adjudications
and jurisprudence generally. Addition of a feminine voice could result
in the differences between men and women being acknowledged in
constitutional adjudication.' She also sees the potential for a feminist
perating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their
Supervisors, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 66, 76, 147-49 (1995).
179. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
72 VA. L. REv. 543, 592-93 (1986).
180. Sherry, supra note 179, at 580-91.
181. GILLIGAN, supra note 165.
182. Sherry, supra note 179, at 592.
183. Sherry, supra note 179, at 595.
184. Sherry, supra note 179, at 596.
185. Sherry, supra note 179, at 613.
186. As examples, Sherry cites Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), and
Steele v. Federal Communications Commission, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cit. 1985), cases
in which the courts were unwilling to acknowledge any difference between men and
women. Sherry, supra note 179, at 613-14.
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jurisprudence, which at the time she wrote her article was still in its
infancy.18 7 Finally, she argued that recognizing a unique feminine per-
spective in and of itself might help lessen the reliance on, as she calls
it, "an overly individualist liberal paradigm."'
Sherry's reliance on allegedly innate differences between men and
women is not without its detractors. Acknowledgment of a Gilli-
ganian "different voice" for women has led to judicial outcomes that
are oppressive to the rights of women.8'
Along with research about the impact of diversity on actual out-
comes of cases, political scientists have long acknowledged the
symbolic importance of a diverse judiciary. Walker and Barrow
summed it up, "[d]escriptive or symbolic representation refers to the
opportunity of groups to have access to position and influence. Par-
ticipation of this variety has a positive legitimizing effect on the
functioning of a democracy. It reflects a degree of openness in the po-
litical process."190
Even in the absence of a trackable difference in voting records,
the symbolic recognition of different groups through judicial ap-
pointment of members of these groups to the bench lends credibility
to the justice these courts render. Judicial decisions have long sup-
ported the idea that a judicial proceeding should not only be fair, but
should appear fair.'9 ' In addition, there is a compelling argument that
appointing women and minority group members to the bench is a
matter of fairness and equal opportunity. 92 These groups have long
been shut out of this important public office, and they deserve to have
the same opportunities as their white male counterparts.
187. Sherry, supra note 179, at 614-15.
188. Sherry, supra note 179, at 615.
189. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 839
F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (accepting the argument that women are less interested in
commission sales in part because it fosters competition between women, who are
more community-oriented). For a concise description of Gilligan's findings see Judith
Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S.
CA.t. L. REv. 1877, 1911-14 (1988).
190. Walker & Barrow, supra note 26, at 597; see also Goldman & Saronson, supra note
83, at 68 ("if federal courts are to have legitimacy among all segments of the Ameri-
can population, no segment should feel excluded on the basis of gender or minority
status").
191. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); United States v. Donato, 99
F.3d 426, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 440, 444
(1995).
192. See Kritzer & Uhlman, supra note 144, at 77.
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Finally, perhaps the most telling information about the status of
gender and race in the legal system is the data and anecdotal evidence
gathered by the gender, ethnic, and racial bias task forces throughout
the country.'93 TheTask Forces of the District of Columbia, Eighth,
Ninth, and Second Circuits have detailed bias and perceived bias on
the part of judges and lawyers directed at female lawyers, witnesses,
and litigants, including bias based on the type of claim involved."4
Likewise, state task forces have noted the bias against women in the
court system.195 The Delaware State Bar Association's Section on
Women and the Law summed up well the need for women on the
bench in its Report to the Gender Bias Committee:
There are serious practical costs to the quality of justice in
our society and ultimately to democratic principles in the
exclusion of women as decision makers from the judicial
system. Such exclusion assures that the process and outcome
of justice reflect the views, values and beliefs of only male
members of our society-less than half of the population.
Decisions regarding the rights and treatment of women
within a court system dominated by men often reflect patri-
archal beliefs about women's role in society."'
193. For a history of the gender bias task force movement, see Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gen-
der Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 237
(1989). For a description of the findings of these task forces as they relate to em-
ployment discrimination cases, see Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary
Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 71, 126-30
(1999).
194. See Beiner, supra note 193, at 126-30. In particular, the Ninth Circuit task force
noted perceived bias against employment discrimination cases. NINT CIRCUIT TASK
FORCE ON GENDER BIAS, ExEcUTnvE SUMMARY OF THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
Nn m CIRCUrr TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS, (1992) available in 45 STAN. L. REv.
2153, 2169-70 (1993). The District of Columbia and Eighth Circuits, also docu-
mented bias in sex discrimination cases in particular. SPECIAL COMM. ON GENDER TO
THE D.C. CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACE AND ETHNIC BIAs, DRAFT FINAL
REPORT 98-102 (1995); EIGHTH CIRCUIT GENDER FJRNEss TASK FORCE, FINAL
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, available in 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 72-73 (1997).
195. See Beiner, supra note 193, at 130-31.
196. DELAWARE STATE BAR AS'N SECTION ON WOMEN AND THE LAW, REPORT TO THE
GENDER BIAs COMMrIrEE 4 (1994).
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CONCLUSION: THE LONG-RUN NEED FOR DIVERsITY
Along with empirical studies and suppositions regarding the ef-
fects of diversity by social scientists, legal scholars, and gender bias
task forces, there is the occasional judicial decision that makes me
think, "[i]f a woman or member of a minority group were deciding
this, the outcome would be different."197 While most judges obviously
are savvy enough to leave racist or sexist comments out of their writ-
ten opinions, decisions, and conduct from the bench, there is the
occasional judge who has deeply ingrained sexist or racist inclinations,
such that they have ceased to be obvious to him or her. The case de-
scribed at the beginning of this article-Catchpole v. Brannon-is such
198
a case.
When President Carter first set out to diversify the federal bench,
critics argued that he would have difficulty finding qualified women
and minority candidates. 99 Yet, the example set by the Carter
Administration reveals that such criticisms are unfounded. 2°0 This
197. This is not to say that women are always unbiased. The recent controversy concern-
ing the alleged racist slurs by Michigan Judge Andrea Ferrara only underscores that
any member of a particular demographic group may have prejudices. See Orlandar
Brand-Williams, Court Removes Ferrara: Action Is Taken Against Wayne County Cir-
cuitJudgesfior Unprofessional Conduct, DETROIT NEWs, June 29, 1998, at 3C.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
199. See generally Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 18; Slomick, supra note 11, at 271. At
the time of the Carter Administration's diversity efforts, Sheldon Goldman set out six
major objections to an "affirmative action" approach to judicial selection. These ob-
jections, which Goldman responded to in turn, included: (1) "[tlhe dangers of
classifying people;" (2) "[t]he threat of reverse discrimination;" (3) "[tlhe error of fo-
cusing on group affiliation;" (4) "[t]he need for government neutrality, not
favoritism;" (5) "[tlhe problem of quotas;" and (6) "[an inappropriate program for
the judiciary." Goldman, Should There Be Afflirmative Action, supra note 11, at 489-
94.
200. See Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action, supra note 11, at 492-93; Gold-
man & Saronson, supra note 83, at 72 (noting that most of Carter's initial appointees
were rated as well qualified or qualified by the ABA); Elliot Slotnick, The Paths to the
Federal Bench: Gender, Race, and Judicial Recruitment Variation, 67 JUDICATURE 370
(1984) (looking at non-traditional Carter appointees); Carl Tobias, Keeping the Cove-
nant on the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L. Ray. 1861, 1862-64 (1994)(discussing
Carter's success at finding competent female and minority appointees); Walker &
Barrow, supra note 26, at 614. In an early article on President Carter's appointments,
Elliot Slotnick noted that Carter's non-traditional appointees did not fare as well in
the ABA rating system as his traditional appointees did. Slotnick, supra note 11, at
295. Slotnick casts doubt on the validity of the ABA's ranking system, arguing that it
might well be biased in favor of the traditional candidate's career path. Slotnick, su-
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criticism is even more unfounded today compared to 1976, when
Carter was elected, because there are now far more qualified women
and minority attorneys.201
The data compiled by political scientists is not entirely conclusive
on the effects of diversity on the bench.2 2 This is not especially sur-
prising, given the difficulty of assessing all the factors that may play a
role in judicial decision making.23 However, with more and more
non-traditional judges being appointed to the bench, more recent
studies suggest that the diversity.they bring to the bench has an actual
effect on the outcome of cases. The problem with political science
data is that a single study cannot account for all the variables that may
impact an individual judge's view of the law or reality. It is much
more complex and involves many categories of information, including
such variables as sex, race, religion, upbringing, political partisanship
and ideology, judicial ideology, appointing president (where applica-
ble), socio-economic background, region of the country in which the
judge was raised or lives, etc.2O4
pra note 11, at 295-296. It is worth noting, however, that only two of Carter's non-
traditional appointees were rated as "not qualified." See Slotnick, supra note 11, at at
296. See also Martin, Gender, supra note 49, at 138-39 (noting that Carter's women
received the two top ABA ratings at a lower rate than his men, while noting that po-
tential bias of the ABA toward "older, well-to-do, business-oriented corporation
attorneys").
201. See Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 Hous. L. REv. 137, 146
(1995)(noting that the judges appointed by President Clinton "are apparently very
well qualified").
202. See George, supra note 21, at 1650 (noting limited success of social science studies
seeking to account for various background influences on judicial behavior).
203. See James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the
Study ofJudicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 8 (1983)("The most striking deficiency
of judicial behavior research is its lack of theoretical decision-making models that (1)
comprehensively include the multititude of stimuli affecting decisions and (2) explain
or predict a considerable portion of the variation in decision making.").
204. Judge Richard Posner suggested a laundry list of "inappropriate" influences, includ-
ing,
personal dislike of a lawyer or litigant, gratitude to the appointing authori-
ties, desire for advancement, irritation with or even a desire to undermine a
judicial colleague or subordinate, willingness to trade votes, desire to be on
good terms with colleagues, not wanting to disagree with people one likes
or respects, fear for personal safety, fear of ridicule, reluctance to offend
one's spouse or dose friends, and racial or class solidarity.
RiCHARm A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 130-31 (1995).
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Political science research also fails to assess the context in which a
case arises.20' Simply put, the facts matter. The legal theory alleged in
the case will also affect the outcome. As one scholar put it, "In short,
there is much more to judicial decision-making than [a]ffecting one's
political preferences. In fact, the search for a single, universal maximand
may be futile." 26 No one study can account for all these variables and
their potential implications in a given case. That is not to say that it's
not worth conducting studies or that political science research has not
supplied some very helpful information. However, I do think the limi-
tations of this research need to be taken into consideration. Fortunately,
most political scientists are willing to recognize the limitations of their
research.20 7 A potential area for additional political science and legal re-
search is a more thorough analysis of actual case files to assess the
impact of the many variables that researchers currently do not take into
account. In addition, it would be helpful in determining the impact of
procedure on particular substantive claims.
208
In spite of studies supporting the attitudinal model, I remain con-
vinced that many judges attempt to use the legal method in resolving
cases. The research of Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab supports this
and suggests, contrary to findings of political scientists, that in the aver-
age case judges use the traditional legal method-look at precedent,
and follow it in the case at hand.209 The result is that case outcomes
are fairly consistent .2' 0 This does not mean that the judge's identity
205. Tracey George and Lee Epstein found, in a study of death penalty cases decided by
the Supreme Court between 1972 and 1991, that an integrated model considering
extralegal and legal factors (such as legally relevant facts) better explained the Su-
preme Court's rulings in this area than a strict application of the attitudinal model.
See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Mak-
ing, 86 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 323, 326, 328 (1992). George has noted the difficulties
these sorts of integrated models pose for the researcher. See George, supra note 21, at
1650.
206. Cross, supra note 13, at 297.
207. See, e.g., Carp et al., supra note 59, at 299 (acknowledging the argument that political
science research cannot consider the factual nuances of each case); see also George &
Epstein, supra note 205, at 328.
208. See generally Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure:
The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. Rv.
211 (1992); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Im-proper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII andADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L Rav. 203
(1993). See also Beiner, supra note 193.
209. See Ashenfelter et al., supra note 13.
210. Of course, there are notable exceptions. Witness the current debate about the actions
of California Appellate Judge J. Anthony Kline, who refused to follow California Su-
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has no impact on the outcome of a particular case or on the law itself.
Instead, it suggests that, at least in certain types of cases, outcomes are
fairly predictable. However, in controversial or precedent-setting
cases, one would expect the judge's background to come into play.
Indeed, it is no surprise that Judges Easterbrook and Posner occasion-
ally cast their decisions in economic terms.2 They have a law-and-
economics ideology that at times is reflected in their decisions.
In particular, cases involving vague legal precedent provide an
opportunity for a judge's ideology to come into play.2'2 When prece-
dent and plain meaning fail them, judges must look to competing
policies. Their particular ideology may influence, if not dictate, which
policy argument they will find most compelling. Among more activist
judges, whether the meaning is plain or the precedent controlling may
be influenced by their ideologies. However, in judging the run-of-the-
mill motion to dismiss, the judge can easily determine whether or not
the plaintiff has pled enough to state a claim. Barring a complainant
attempting a novel extension of the law (which is rare), ideology will
likely not affect the decision.
So, what do we want of judges? Who is the ideal judge? Tradi-
tionally, lawyers have focused on impartiality, independence, and
disengagement as the traits that are required for effective judging.23
Individual attorneys might prefer that judges be inclined to favor their
particular claims. The best judge, however, should be able to see and
assess the differing perspectives of the many parties and persons in-
volved in the litigation. This is where diversity becomes important.
For example, it is doubtful that a female judge sitting on the panel in
Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operation?4 would have
agreed with Justice Posner's contention that the terms "bitch" and
"sick bitch" were gender-neutral (or were, at least, gender-neutral as a
matter of law, which is what Posner effectively ruled) as applied to the
preme Court precedent, and is now being brought up on charges of judicial miscon-
duct in California. See Nancy McCarthy, Judge Faces Discipline for Opinion, August
1998 Cti_ BARJ. at 1, 22.
211. See, e.g., Metz v. Transmit Mix, 828 F.2d 1202, 1217 (7th Cir. 1987)(Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (discussing an age discrimination case in terms of economics); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 235-
37 (7th Cir. 1993)(Posner, J.)(discussing an employment discrimination case in eco-
nomic terms).
212. See George, supra note 21, at 1667.
213. See Resnick, supra note 189, at 1881-86.
214. Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996).
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female sexual harassment plaintiff in that case. 215 At the least, one
would expect a female judge to question such a supposition, especially
at the summary judgment stage. Her input might have prompted
Judge Posner to reconsider his position and even change his mind on
the issue. Therein lies the value of diversity. Perhaps, for a moment,
Judge Posner could have stepped into the shoes of Ms. Galloway, as
she experienced being called a "bitch" and a "sick bitch" frequently
during a four-year period. This may be the most salient advantage that
diversity brings to the federal courts. 6 It allows judges, at least for the
purposes of a particular case, to understand that person's perspective
and take it into account in judging.217 t
215. Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1168.
216. Political scientists' "strategic behavior" model would support such an influence. See
supra text accompanying notes 138-142; see also Goldman, Should There Be Affirma-
tiveAction supra note 11, at 494. As Goldman put it:
A judge who is a member of a racial minority or a woman cannot help but
bring to the bench a certain sensitivity-indeed, certain qualities of the
heart or mind-that may be particularly helpful in dealing with these is-
sues.... [T]he presence on the bench in visible numbers of well qualified
judges drawn from the minorities and women cannot help but add a new
dimension of justice to our courts.
See Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action, supra note 11, at 494. See also
Slomick, supra note 11, at 272-73 ("Indeed the presence and perspective of non-
traditional judges would likely increase the sensitivities of already seated white male
colleagues in ways which could have a considerably greater impact on the judicial
process than the direct contribution of the new judges.").
217. Harper Lee in her dassic novel, To KiUIA Mockingbird, summed up this phenomenon
best in a description of her heroine, Scout, on the porch of neighbor Boo Radley's
residence. In this portion of the novel, Scout is trying to grapple with the nature of
Radley's existence.
Neighbors bring food with death and flowers with sickness and little
things in between. Boo was our neighbor. He gave us two soap dolls, a
broken watch and chain, a pair of good-luck pennies, and our lives. But
neighbors give in return. We never put back into the tree what we took out
of it: we had given him nothing, and it made me sad.
I turned to go home. Street lights winked down the street all the way
to town. I had never seen our neighborhood from this angle. There were
Miss Maudie's, Miss Stephanie's-there was our house, I could see the
porch swing-Miss Rachel's house was beyond us, plainly visible. I could
even see Mrs. Dubose's.
I looked behind me. To the left of the brown door was a long shut-
tered window. I walked to it, stood in front of it, and turned around. In
daylight, I thought you could see to the postoffice corner.
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Daylight... in my mind, the night faded. It was daytime and the
neighborhood was busy. Miss Stephanie Crawford crossed the street to tell
the latest to Miss Rachel. Miss Maudie bent over her azaleas. It was sum-
mertime, and two children scampered down the sidewalk toward a man
approaching in the distance. The man waved, and the children raced each
other to him.
It was still summertime, and the children came doser. A boy trudged
down the sidewalk dragging a fishing-pole behind him. A man stood wait-
ing with his hands on his hips. Summertime, and his children played in the
front yard with their friend, enacting a strange drama of their own inven-
tion.
It was fall, and his children fought on the sidewalk in front of Mrs.
Dubose's. The boy helped his sister to her feet, and they made their way
home. Fall, and his children trotted to and fro around the corner, the day's
woes and triumphs on their faces. They stopped at the oak tree, delighted,
puzzled, apprehensive.
Winter, and his children shivered at the front gate, silhouetted against
a blazing house. Winter, and a man walked into the street, dropped his
glasses, and shot a dog.
Summer, and he watched his children's heart break. Autumn again,
and Boo's children needed him.
Atticus was right. One time he said you never really know a man until
you stand in his shoes and walk around in them. Just standing on the
Radley porch was enough.
HARmER L.E, To KIULL A MOCINGBIRD 293-94 (J.P. Lippincott Co. 1960).
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